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Abstract: The greatest coup that European science has experienced in its histo-
ry took place in the Renaissance. It is common knowledge that at that time 
there was a revival of ideological paradigms which were formed in Antiquity. 
However, the application of this statement to the realm of philosophy requires 
clarification. The late Middle Ages was influenced by the philosophy of Aristo-
tle, who was also an ancient philosopher. Therefore, on the eve of the Renais-
sance, Antiquity was not forgotten. In the Renaissance, the philosophy of Plato 
was revived, and in the late Middle Ages, it was displaced by the philosophy of 
Aristotle. The philosophy of Plato became the foundation for the formation of 
the paradigm of modern science. The purpose of this study is to reveal which 
segments of Plato’s philosophy gave impetus to the development of science, 
and to prove that Plato influenced the development of science by three theses: 
1) the theory is higher and more important than experience, as the world of 
ideas is higher and more important than the material world; 2) cognition of the 
world is impossible without the application of mathematical categories; 3) ex-
perience is necessary for cognition, but it is completely subordinated to the 
theory. 
Keywords: Plato, the Renaissance, scientific revolution, scientific progress. 
 
© Shepetyak, O. (2019). Plato and the Revolution of the Modern Paradigm of Science. Bey-
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Introduction 
A well-known fact is that the Renaissance was a turning point in the 
history of European culture. Innovations brought by the Renaissance 
have been reflected in the most diverse spheres of life of Europeans. Pe-
culiarities of painting, sculpture, architecture, literature, etc. of this 
epoch have become the subject of numerous studies. Similarly, thousands 
of volumes were devoted to the study of the Renaissance philosophy. 
However, much less attention was devoted to the revolution, carried out 
by the Renaissance in science. In the middle and second half of the twen-
tieth century, this gap was filled with some invaluable works, among 
which the works of Alexandre Koyré and Annelise Maier occupy a special 
place. These scientists proved that the Renaissance was the birth of a 
modern scientific paradigm. However, the question remains open: what 
was a particular feature of the Renaissance that gave it the opportunity to 
start the phenomenon of modern science. We believe that the founda-
tion, on which modern science was formed, was the philosophy of the 
Renaissance that changed the outlook and methodological approaches of 
European scientists. 
1. “La Revanche de Platon” 
The most brilliant scientist whose research will be useful to us as 
nothing else is Alexandre Koyré, a French researcher in the history of 
science, who devoted his talents to studying the peculiarities of the Re-
naissance science. Koyré asked himself the question: what exactly hap-
pened at that time? The studies of the scientist, in our opinion, are so 
valuable that a little more time should be devoted to the analysis of the 
problem he was engaged in, extending his thoughts to the studies of other 
scientists and his own conclusions. Koyré believed that “La revanche de 
Platonˮ was a peculiar feature of the Renaissance (1985: 19). The very 
name of the epoch “Renaissance” reports that at that time something was 
revived. It is common knowledge that achievements of Antiquity were 
revived at that time. However, there is one nuance that needs to be clari-
fied. It is possible to revive what was lost or went into oblivion. In the 
last centuries before the Renaissance, the ideas of Aristotle, cultivated by 
Saint Thomas Aquinas and other scholastics, flourished in the philosoph-
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ical world. The fact that Aristotle, an ancient thinker who was not only 
not forgotten, but also was at the root of the philosophy of the Late 
Middle Ages, means that Antiquity was not alien for the Middle Ages. 
They were in a close ideological affinity. Accordingly, the Renaissance 
ideologists could not set themselves the goal of simply reviving Antiquity. 
They revived those teachings of the ancient world, which in those ancient 
times stood in opposition to Aristotle. In other words, they tried to criti-
cize Aristotle, while referring to those who have already disagreed with 
him in Antiquity. Plato was the only great thinker who could be opposed 
to Aristotle. This means that the Renaissance thinkers sought to clear 
the underpinning of the outlook of their time from the philosophy of 
Aristotle, and to insert Plato’s doctrine there. This is exactly what Fran-
cis Bacon meant. He believed that Aristotle’s argumentative methods 
spoiled natural philosophy (2013: 47). It is obvious that, like Aristotle of 
the Middle Ages, is not identical to Aristotle of Antiquity, so Plato of the 
Renaissance is not identical to Plato of Antiquity. Saint Thomas and 
other scholastics needed Aristotle only to help them in the inculturation 
of Christianity. Renaissance thinkers took from Plato only what most 
impressed them. And they took so much that it gave Koyré the oppor-
tunity to make loud statements: “According to Galilei, the new science is 
an experimental proof of Platonism” (1966: 175), and also: “For Galilei, 
Plato’s cosmogony is not an ordinary myth, as it is in ‘Timaeus’; for him it 
is possible – if not to say ‘true’ – story” (1968: 265). 
In Plato’s teaching there are several moments that have influenced 
the philosophy and science of the Renaissance. The Athenian genius 
believed that the world was formed on the model of eternally existing 
ideas. Like any thing made by a human being is produced according to a 
particular project that precedes this thing, the same way the world, as a 
great integrity, is formed on the model of a particular project. As in the 
world of products of human creativity, the project, embodied in things, 
always remains external to them, the same way the project of the universe 
Plato places in the world of ideas that always remains transcendental to 
the world of things. Human souls, while in the world of ideas, saw a true, 
exemplary being. However, getting into the human body, they forgot 
what they had seen at the time of their own pre-existence. The fact that a 
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person saw the true being will always stimulate to restore the knowledge 
one has. Perceiving material things with the flesh, one recalls what he saw 
in the world of ideas, after all, to seek and to cognize means to remember. 
This allows thinking in general categories, despite the fact that one ob-
serves single facts of reality. Another important segment of Plato’s 
thought is that he, maybe under the influence of Pythagoras or because of 
the same educational space trends, brings mathematics to a high level. 
Plato places mathematical categories between ideas and the material 
world. These categories ensure the proportional implementation of ideas, 
which allows us to see the same quality in different things, but to varying 
degrees.  
2. Theory is Over Experience 
From the above we can distinguish three main features that had a 
revolutionary influence on the development of human knowledge and lay 
in the methodological and axiomatic basis of modern science. The first 
one is of particular interest. Plato’s philosophy proclaimed the thesis that 
true knowledge is beyond the material world, and not in it. What is in the 
world of mind is much more important for cognition than what is in the 
world of things. In the language of modern scientific methodology, this 
sounds like this: the theory is primary and dominant in terms of experi-
ence. The science from the Renaissance and to this day is based on the 
principles that exalt the theory. Experience instead plays a role either of 
arguments for the theory, or arguments against it, but is never its source. 
This idea requires some evidence, in the search for which we will look at 
the history of science. The natural science of the Renaissance and subse-
quent centuries was determined by the figures of Galileo Galilei and Sir 
Isaac Newton. Among the numerous discoveries of these scientists and 
their colleagues was a change in understanding the nature of the motion. 
The problem of motion was central to the physics of the Middle Ages; at 
least the researcher of the Renaissance breakthrough in science Annelise 
Maier, who wrote that the phenomenon of motion was “the source and 
the central point of scholastic physics”, thought so. (1949: 10). Through-
out the history of physics, the understanding of the phenomenon of mo-
tion has changed. Its first interpretation, adopted in Antiquity and the 
Middle Ages, was proposed by Aristotle. He believed that the motion is a 
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Plato and the Revolution of the Modern Paradigm of Science 
transition from the dynamis to the energeia. At the same time, motion of 
material objects is a phenomenon caused by the action of external force. 
Exceptions to this rule are beings that have a source of motion in them-
selves. That's how Aristotle's theory of motion was interpreted in the 
Middle Ages. A body moves when something acts on it. Accordingly, the 
force acting on the body is the cause of its motion. The modern under-
standing of the motion is completely different: motion as a natural state 
of the body is a starting point. Accordingly, the body is always moving 
(even if its speed is zero). An ideal space in which there are no forces is 
depicted as an illustration to this theory of motion. A body moving at a 
certain speed in such a space will move infinitely and without changing 
the speed, since the force of gravity, friction, and so on will not act on it. 
If a body moves in the usual space, then external forces necessarily act on 
it, which, however, do not cause the motion itself, but only change its 
speed and direction. We observe that all known bodies after the end of 
the external impulse slow down its motion and eventually stop. This is 
not because external force no longer acts on it, but because it is influ-
enced by the forces of gravity and friction that change the speed of the 
body, until it is completely stopped. If the body moves along the curved 
surface from the top to the bottom and increases its speed, then it means 
that the force of gravity that accelerates it is greater than the force of 
friction that slows it down. Our superficially described understanding of 
the motion rooted in classical mechanics has one important feature that 
we cannot ignore. Aristotle and scholastics could directly see what they 
described. They could touch the body on the table, and notice that it 
changed the place of its location. In other words: the Aristotelian-
scholastic concept of motion was evident.  
In the context of the theory of cognition, the history of understand-
ing the nature of motion in physics is interesting to us only as an example, 
which perfectly illustrates the role of theory in cognition. While formu-
lating the first concept of motion Aristotle did not apply the experiment 
method. He used only observation, albeit primitive. However, Galilei and 
Newton did not use even this method. It is impossible to see how the 
body moves without the action of any force. Under conditions of the 
material world it is impossible to find an environment in which no forces 
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would act. Einstein and Infeld describe this problem as follows: “We have 
seen that this law of inertia cannot be derived directly from the experi-
ment, but only by speculative thinking consistent with observation. The 
idealized experiment can never be actually performed, although it leads to 
a profound understanding of real experiments” (1966: 8). There are many 
similar examples in physics. 
What is the basis of understanding of the motion in the new sci-
ence? It is exclusively the theory. The main element of the new under-
standing of the motion is the postulate of the notion of an ideal space, in 
which there are no forces. Neither Renaissance scientists nor their col-
leagues from this time could observe such a space, since it does not exist. 
The ideal space is a fiction, but it is necessary for science. Without it, it 
would be impossible to construct a new theory of motion. The scholars of 
the new science are not at all upset by the fact that they have to base 
their arguments on something that is not only not observed in the real 
world. For science, this is not a problem. After all, what is the reality? For 
Plato, this is just a dim reflection of the world of ideas. If a person justi-
fies something rationally, it means that one recalls what he saw in the 
world of ideas, that is, true being. It is more important than reflection. 
Even if in material reality there is something that does not correspond to 
the ideal reality, then it is nothing else than imperfection that has pene-
trated the process of creating the world. Science is full of examples, when 
the theory does not take into account the facts of reality. The model of 
the scientific cognition of the Renaissance and modern times, the basis of 
which is laid by Newton, is a theory whose empirical verification is im-
possible. It was not in vain that the advocate of the empirical experience 
in epistemology, Ernst Mach, required to review Newton’s mechanics, 
since he considered it devoid of content, as it could not be verified em-
pirically (1889: 213). 
Another remarkable example of the temporal and substantive priori-
ty of the theory is the discovery of the seventh planet of the solar system. 
For several millennia, our star-planetary system consisted of six planets. 
After the assertion of heliocentrism by Copernicus, the result of which 
was positing the Sun in the center, the planets known at that time and 
whose number did not change from the time of ancient astronomers, 
  
B e y t u l h i k m e  9 ( 2 )  2 0 1 9 
B
e
y
t
u
l
h
i
k
m
e
 
A
n
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
 
o
f
 
P
h
i
l
o
s
o
p
h
y
 
325 
Plato and the Revolution of the Modern Paradigm of Science 
were located in a certain order, according to their distance from the Sun. 
So Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn were known to sci-
ence. There was no other information about the solar system. It is gener-
ally accepted that the notion of ‘expansion’ of the boundaries of the solar 
system occurred in 1781. It was in this year the English astronomer of 
German origin, Friedrich William Herschel, at a meeting of the Royal 
Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge, announced the 
introduction of a new planet, which was decided to be called Uranus. The 
history of science records exclusively those scientists who have recorded 
the empirical confirmation of the fact of reality, and ignores the theorists 
who first described these facts and provoked empirical searches. Her-
schel’s name is known in astronomy. However, historians of science rarely 
wonder whether Herschel would begin to seek empirical evidence of the 
existence of Uranus, if there were no theoretical substantiation of the 
existence of Uranus. It seems that the idea of the existence of the sev-
enth planet was first expressed by Immanuel Kant (1755: 55) in 1755, when 
the Königsberg scholar devoted a lot of attention to the problems of 
natural science. Kant’s guesses about the seventh planet were based on 
the theory of Newton. So who exactly is the discoverer of the planet 
Uranus, Kant or Herschel, given that Kant wrote about this planet 26 
years before Herschel saw her? In the history of science there is a tradi-
tion that the scientist, who brought forward the evidence of the existence 
of a phenomenon is recognized as a discoverer. The question of the dis-
coverer is always controversial, even in the plane of theoretical considera-
tions. For example, today it is generally accepted that the discoverer of 
the theory of general gravity was Sir Isaac Newton, who first put it in the 
work “Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica” in 1678. However, 
this theory has already been described by the French scientist Giles Per-
sonne de Roberval (1644: 148). And already in 1646, René Descartes ex-
pressed the first systematic critique of this theory. However, let’s return 
to the history of the planets. 
The history of the eighth planet of the solar system is similar to that 
of Uranus. In 1848 Neptune was discovered. When asked who exactly 
discovered it, today it is difficult to answer clearly even for experienced 
science historians. Usually the whole pleiad of scientists is named: the 
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Englishman John Couch Adams, the Frenchman Urbain Jean Joseph Le 
Verrier and the German Johann Gottfried Galle. In order to see the rela-
tion of each of them to the planet Neptune, you need to plunge into this 
fascinating story. After the discovery of Uranus, a steady idea about the 
six planets of the solar system was destroyed. If there is a seventh, then 
why not search for the eighth! Besides, as always everything new is of 
particular interest, so astronomers were fascinated by the study of Ura-
nus. Special success was achieved here by the English royal astronomer Sir 
George Biddell Airy, who in 1832 said that the orbit of Uranus actually 
goes with certain deviations from the expectations based on the theory of 
Newton. Since the theory in the new science, like the world of Plato’s 
ideas, is untouchable, nobody doubted the truthfulness of Newton’s 
thoughts. The problem began to be sought in nature. On this basis, yet 
unknown scientist Adams conducted accurate calculations, and described 
some of the characteristics of a new planet, which nobody had seen yet, 
but which was necessary to explain the orbital perturbation of Uranus. 
Adams’ studies have not been approved by Airy, and have not been devel-
oped in England. At the same time, similar studies in France were con-
ducted by Le Verrier, who in 1945-46 presented the Académie française 
descriptions and almost accurate calculations of the location of the 
eighth planet. Airy, though pointing out similarities in the calculations of 
Adams and Le Verrier, continued to ignore them. Galle began empirical 
quest for the eighth planet at the request of Le Verrier. Based on the 
calculations of the predecessors, “September 23, 1846, Galle opened the 
Neptune” (Franz 1910: 311). So who is the real discoverer of Neptune: 
Adams, Le Verrier or Galle? The latter probably did the least: he only 
sent the appropriate devices at the Berlin Observatory to the point that 
the theorists had pointed out to him and saw the eighth planet. But it 
was he who gave science the empirical evidence of the existence of a 
planet, which was guessed, as one believes, or which was discovered, ac-
cording to others, by Adams and Le Verrier. 
No less fascinating was the story of the ninth planet of the Solar Sys-
tem. In 1930, Clyde William Tombaugh of the Lowell Observatory re-
ported the successful completion of the quest for the ninth planet 
launched by Percival Lowell in 1906. This planet was named Pluto. To-
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day, Pluto is no longer considered a planet because it does not dominate 
in its own orbit and is only 7% of the total mass of all bodies, along with 
which it is in one orbit. Due to Pluto’s mismatch with other planets, by 
the decision of the International Astronomical Union August 24, 2006, 
Pluto was deprived of the status of the planet and transferred to the rank 
of dwarf planets, where he took his place with Ceres, Eris, Makemake 
and Haumea. Still, for 76 years, Pluto was considered a full-fledged planet. 
The discovery of the ninth planet is a good illustration of the domination 
of the theory over empirical data. Thus, the discovery of Neptune did not 
give answers to all the questions that arose in the scientific community to 
orbital perturbation of Uranus. Studying the characteristics of Neptune 
certainly explained the perturbation of Uranus, but not all. This led to 
the idea that besides Neptune, there is another planet that influences 
Uranus. Percival Lowell, who built one of the oldest American observato-
ries in northern Arizona, along with his colleague, William Henry Picker-
ing, Harvard University professor, came to the conclusion that other 
planet acting on the Uranus must exist in the Solar System. Lowell called 
it ‘Planet X’. Lowell’s death, which occurred in 1919, for some time sus-
pended the search for the Planet beyond Neptune. However, after a 
while, the searches were restored. The young scientist Tombaugh discov-
ered a planet from Lowell’s observatory in 1930. And again the same ques-
tion: who should be considered the true discoverer of Pluto – Lowell or 
Tombaugh? Lowell put his whole life in search of the Planet beyond Nep-
tune, he built his own observatory at his own expense, because he be-
lieved and even knew that the Planet beyond Neptune existed; he per-
suaded his colleagues in its existence. Conducting searches according to 
Lowell’s calculations, it took a year for Tombaugh to fix the planet. Is it 
fair to give the glory of the discoverer to the scientist, whose genius, 
though undeniable, performed only a technical role in this process? 
Presenting examples from the history of science, which show how 
crucial was the influence of the theory on fixing empirical data, one can-
not ignore the brightest of such examples, namely the discovery of Julius 
Lothar von Meyer and Dmitri Mendeleev in the field of chemistry. Out-
standing scientists, who are known to each one through the periodic 
table of elements, prove the decisive role of the theory in practice. Von 
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Meyer in 1864 and Mendeleev in 1869, placing chemical elements in a 
certain sequence, according to their properties, noticed that the logic of 
the placement of elements does not coincide with the data that they 
possess. Scientists knew only 63 chemical elements at that time. Today, 
118 elements are known, 89 of which are in nature, while others have been 
discovered as a result of nuclear reactions. All 118 elements found their 
place in the periodic table, since from the periodic law itself it could not 
only be assumed about the existence of elements that had to fill the gaps 
in the table in future, but the information about some of their properties 
could be obtained. Before Pierre Curie and Marie Skłodowska-Curie 
discovered polonium in 1898, a place for it had already been prepared in 
the periodic table. The study of von Meyer and Mendeleev is a theory 
that helped many scientists to find its practical application. 
There are numerous examples similar to the new explanation of the 
nature of the motion, the discovery of three new planets of the Solar 
System, and the filling of the periodic table. Moreover, no empirical dis-
covery appeared without the prior appearance of the theory. Even when a 
scientist sees facts of reality that does not have a place in his theoretical 
constructions, he simply does not notice it. How often astronomers 
watched the starry sky, the same sky that Copernicus also watched, but 
they did not notice that the Sun was in the center of our stellar system. 
How often people looked at the variety of elements that fill the Earth, 
but only saw soil, water, fire and air, and guessed about the ether that 
would have to fill interstellar space. How often people watched objects 
fall to the ground, however, they saw in it the attraction to the centre of 
the Universe, and not the effect of gravity. The theory gives glasses, 
through which a person sees the world, but which at the same time paint 
it in its own colour. This led to the revision of Newton’s mechanics in 
Einstein’s theory of relativity, which is even less likely to be empirically 
verified. In this context, it is difficult for us to disagree with Webster 
who believed: “It is correct, of course, to perceive the architect, the water 
engineer and the mechanic to be practical people. Indeed they are: but 
one ought not to overlook the fact that theoretical knowledge has been 
learned by these practitioners and in turn integrated into their practical 
work” (2004: 39). 
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To affirm that the theory generates experience would be too uncriti-
cal. However, this still does not give grounds for completely abandoning 
the assumption that empirical data can have some influence on the for-
mation of the theory. From the given examples, and a number of such 
examples can be continued almost to infinity, it becomes apparent that 
experience is preceded by the theory. This means that data of experience 
have no direct influence on the formation of the theory. However, in 
order not to be hasty, in the future we will return to the analysis of the 
possibility of indirect influence of empirical data on the formation of the 
theory. 
The examples presented here show what exactly were and are the 
emphases in science from Renaissance to this day. The dominance of the 
theory became possible only due to the changed philosophical settings 
that underlie any outlook. 
3. Mathematics and Experience 
The dominance of the theory over experience was not the only con-
sequence of the revival of Platonism, albeit the most important. Another 
consequence of Plato’s revenge was the mathematization of science. Me-
dieval scholars did not work with calculations. Mathematical categories 
were used only in those areas where it is absolutely necessary. Basically, 
the calculations were the prerogative of the money lenders and money 
changers. Since the Renaissance, science was no longer able to do without 
mathematics. One of the most creative Renaissance thinkers, Cardinal 
Nicholas of Cusa, wrote: “Saint Augustine and later Boethius asserted 
that the number was undoubtedly in the mind of the Creator as his chief 
model for the creation of things” (1937: 24), and also: “in creating the 
world, God used arithmetic, geometry, music, and likewise astronomy” 
(1937: 106). Today, each branch of knowledge is full of calculations. This 
is inherent not only in natural sciences, but also in the humanities and 
social sciences. Globalization and international contacts, which reached 
their peak in the twentieth century, forced to unify the units of meas-
urement. So, in the 1960s the 11th General Conference on Measures and 
Weights adopted a unified system of measurement units Le Système 
International d’Unités. 
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The desire to define the units of measurement as accurately as pos-
sible was generated by the cultivation of the number, which was rooted in 
the philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato. The founder of the Academy of 
Athens believed that ideas are embodied in matter not arbitrarily, but 
proportionally, with well-defined harmony. If, according to the rules of 
constructing the definition, the definition of the content of the concept 
requires the enumeration of all its essential features, that is, the concepts 
at the intersection of which definiendum is created, then this definition 
can describe a species concept that is general. Definiendum is a general 
concept, even if the degree of its generality is less than the generic con-
cept of definiens. We can construct definitions of concepts, rather than 
concrete, single things. In other words: we can construct definition of a 
square, but we cannot define the square table that is in my room; we can 
define a sphere, but not a soccer ball, which is now played by children in 
the yard. In order to cover the subject, it is not enough for us to know 
the definition of its essence, which is present in the definition. Here one 
more important aspect is needed, namely the outline of mathematical 
proportions. At the theoretical level, we know that a rectangle is a plane 
geometric figure that has four straight angles and four pairs of parallel 
sides. This knowledge is sufficient to us for theoretical mathematics, but 
not enough for the applied one. To make a billboard, it is not enough for 
the craftsman to know that it should be rectangular. He also needs to 
know the size of the sides. In order to prepare the medicine, the pharma-
cist is interested not only in the ingredients of the drug, but also exact 
proportions. Everything in the world can be measured by number. The 
units of measurement that have evolved over the millennia cover every-
thing that exists. Michael Polanyi spoke the most profoundly about the 
mathematization of science. He was convinced that the science of the 
Renaissance and modern times felt a tremendous influence on Pythago-
reanism and Platonism. He asserted this among other things in relation 
to the founder of Heliocentism: “The revival of astronomical theory by 
Copernicus after two millennia was a conscious return to the Pythagore-
an tradition. While studying law in Bologna he worked with the professor 
of astronomy, Novara, a leading Platonist, who taught that the universe 
was to be conceived in terms of simple mathematical relationships” (1985: 
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25). The most pronounced statement about the mathematization of sci-
ence is the phrase of Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem: “ One of the claims 
to fame of the geniuses who made the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries distinguished was the recognition of the truth that physics would not 
become a clear and precise science, exempt from the perpetual, sterile 
disputes characterizing its history till then, and would not be capable of 
demanding universal assent for its doctrines so long as it would not speak 
the language of geometers. They created a true theoretical physics by 
their understanding that it had to be mathematical physics” (1906: 172). 
The third significant feature of modern science, generated by Plato’s 
revenge, is the interest in these experiences. At first glance, the idea of 
increasing the cost of experience contradicts the previously expressed 
view about the priority of the theory over experience. In fact, these two 
segments are harmoniously consistent with the teachings of Plato. Ac-
cording to the Athenian philosopher, the true knowledge is construction 
of ideas. However, in our situation, when we are in the body, the recollec-
tion of what we have seen in the world of ideas is possible only as a result 
of the observation of material things in which ideas are embodied. It 
follows that empirical data are a necessary step in the process of gaining 
knowledge. Some scholars believed that the nature of science of the Re-
naissance and modern times was determined by Pythagoras with the cult 
of number and Democritus with the cult of empiricism and mechanics. 
In particular, Michael Polanyi wrote:  
“After Copernicus, Kepler continued wholeheartedly the Pythagore-
an quest for harmonious numbers and geometrical excellence” (1965: 5). 
The thinker of ancient atomism is difficult to be called an empiricist, 
especially when he claimed: “Only in the general opinion there exists 
sweet, by convention bitter, by convention warm, by convention cold, by 
convention color, whereas in reality there are only atoms and the void” 
(1955: 61). Historians of philosophy have no doubt that Pythagoras had a 
tremendous influence on Plato. The concept of the number cultivated in 
the Pythagorean Union was also reflected in the Plato’s Academy. After 
all, if the struggle in the Renaissance took place between the giants Aris-
totle and Plato, then it is unlikely that along with them in this confronta-
tion the voice of Pythagoras or Democritus could be heard. If the science 
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of the Renaissance and modern times turned its attention to empirical 
data, then it was only to the extent that they found themselves in the 
Plato’s philosophy. And here they really occupied a special place. In Aris-
totelian-scholastic philosophy, experience also occupied a significant 
place. To illustrate, it’s enough to recall at least the well-known medieval 
sententia “Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu”, ex-
pressed by Saint Thomas Aquinas. However, the experience in both phil-
osophical concepts is not identical. In Aristotle’s philosophy, the sense-
perception was direct: what was seen by the eye, was fixed by the mind. 
Let’s return to the example above with a change in the notion of motion. 
In Aristotle’s physics, the force acting on an object causes its motion. In 
the ‘new’ science, external force does not cause the motion itself, but its 
speed and direction. A new understanding of the movement required the 
postulation of absolute space, completely fictitious and absent in reality. 
Aristotle was not inclined to resort to such speculations of the mind. He 
described the motion as it is perceived by the eye. Today, after a long 
school, at sometimes university studying, we are convinced that the pic-
ture generated by the naked eye does not correspond to reality, or better, 
to say: the picture of reality that dominates the minds of the present. 
Aristotle is often accused of distorting the picture of the world and con-
structing a model of the universe that is not true. Perhaps it is so. But 
that model, which Aristotle built, corresponded to the fact that was seen 
by his eye. The modern picture of the world corresponds not to what was 
seen by the eye, but what was seen by mind, but not the reality.  
Equally striking example is the change of the astronomical paradigm. 
The struggle that broke out between Claudia Ptolemy’s geocentricism 
and Nicolaus Copernicus’s heliocentrism, presents a different perception 
of experience. Today we know that in the center of the stellar system 
there is the Sun. Heliocentrism confirms experience, but special experi-
ence: obtained through research technology and clear mathematical cal-
culations. It was not at Aristotle’s disposal. He could rely only on his own 
eye. And it, like to Aristotle, today shows to us that the Sun rises on the 
eastern horizon and sets on the western, that means, it revolves around 
the Earth. And again experience, but one that is given to man by the eye, 
and not by mind. So, these examples show that the concept of ‘experi-
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ence’ is significant. Experience is present both in science based on the 
philosophy of Aristotle, and in that based on Plato, but it is not the same. 
The first can be called the experience of the eye, or direct experience, the 
second – the experience of mind, or theoretical experience. Not all of our 
beliefs are based on truth. Many of them are based on an agreement. No 
one today objects to the assertion that Kyiv is located at 30°31'25'' east 
longitude. But its founders, obviously, did not guess about this fact. Such 
coordinates are due not to reality, but only to the fact that it is now ac-
cepted to calculate the coordinates taking the reference point of the so-
called ‘prime meridian’, which passes through the English city of Green-
wich. And the prime meridian became decisive only because in 1675 King 
Charles II preferred to build an observatory here, which later became 
central to Britain, received state funding and support, and its director got 
the title of royal astronomer. There are many examples similar to the 
prime meridian. Modernity accepts them as granted, but does not associ-
ate with them a picture of the world. 
Conclusion 
The world of Aristotle and the world of Plato find their foundations 
in their philosophies. Plato saw the true world through the prism of the 
mind sublime to the heavens; Aristotle saw it through the tumultuous 
and direct senses. It is difficult not to agree with Bacon, who wrote: “I 
regard every one of the accepted systems as the staging and acting out of 
a fable, making a fictitious staged world of its own. I don’t say this only 
about the systems that are currently fashionable, or only about the an-
cient sects and philosophies; many other fables of the same kind may still 
be written and produced, seeing that errors can be widely different yet 
have very similar causes” (2013: 38). 
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Öz: Avrupa biliminin, tarihinde yaşadığı en büyük darbe Rönesans'ta gerçekleş-
ti. O zamanlar, Antik dönemde oluşturulan ideolojik paradigmaların yeniden 
canlandığı yaygın bir bilgidir. Ancak, bu ifadenin felsefe alanına uygulanmasının 
açıklığa kavuşturulması gerekir. Geç Ortaçağ, aynı zamanda Antik bir filozof 
olan Aristoteles'in felsefesinden etkilenmiştir. Bu nedenle, Rönesans arifesinde, 
Antik çağ unutulmadı. Rönesans'ta Platon'un felsefesi yeniden canlandı ve Geç 
Orta Çağ'da Aristoteles'in felsefesi ile yer değiştirdi. Platon'un felsefesi modern 
bilim paradigmasının oluşumunun temeli oldu. Bu çalışmanın amacı Platon'un 
felsefesinin hangi bölümlerinin bilimin gelişmesine ivme kazandırdığını ortaya 
koymak ve Platon'un bilimin gelişimini üç tezle etkilediğini kanıtlamaktır: 1) 
idealar dünyasının maddi dünyadan daha yüce ve daha önemli olması gibi, teori 
de deneyimden daha yüce ve daha önemlidir; 2) dünya hakkındaki biliş, mate-
matiksel kategoriler uygulanmadan mümkün değildir; 3) deneyim biliş için ge-
reklidir, ancak tamamen teoriye bağımlıdır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Platon, Rönesans, bilimsel devrim, bilimsel ilerleme, para-
digma. 
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